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University of Michigan 
ABSTRACT. The importance of transference has been emphasized by psychodynamically 
oriented clinicians since Freud. This article examines transference phenomena from an informa- 
tion processing perspective, delineates several different aspects of transference experience, and 
shows how experimental research documents processes involved in transference. It distinguishes 
between transference as person schemas/object representations, attachment, schema-triggered 
affect, interpersonal expectancies, scripts, and defenses, and argues for the importance of 
making such distinctions. It attempts, further, to demonstrate the clinical utility of examining 
and working with transference phenomena in the alteration of dysfunctional schemas and 
maladaptive mechanisms of affect-regulation. 
The play’s the thing wherein I’ll catch the conscience of the king. -Hamlet 
For when all is said and done, it is impossible to destroy anyone in absentiu or in 
effisie, -Freud (1912, p. 108) 
I was recently referred for projective testing of a woman who was hospitalized 
for depression and possible borderline personality disorder. The first session pro- 
ceeded rather uneventfully; she had a jaded, cynical style about her and tended to 
give up on tasks when she had the slightest reason to believe that she might not 
complete them successfully. When I returned for the second session, it was clear 
that she would not give me any more information unless I backed away from the 
more rigid testing format and simply talked with her for a while. After doing so 
for a half an hour, we returned to the testing, at which point she proceeded to keep 
me for two hours in order to complete a test that normally takes about 30 minutes. 
At the end of the session, having manipulated me into staying (in various only 
dimly masked ways), she denounced me as a liar for having kept her beyond the 
hour-and-a-half that I had, the previous day, forecast for the second session. 
Requests for should be addressed to Departments of Psychology and Psychiatry, Universi- 
ty of Michigan, 580 Union Drive, Ann Arbor, MI 48109. 
I would like to express my appreciation to Nancy Cantor and Dennis Klos for their useful 
comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
161 
D. M%sten 
The process I had just experienced with this patient was far more useful 
diagnostically than an MMPI profile, a Hamilton depression score, or a set of 
TAT responses. I came out of the session feeling as if I had victimized her, while in 
reality 1 had merely administered a standard battery of psychological tests. The 
theme of victimization permeated both the content and process of the testing, as 
she presented herself as a person who pushes people away with derision and 
cynicism in order to protect herself from the abuse she expects to receive. The 
extent to which she does this in all relationships obviously cannot be assessed in 
her interaction with a single tester in a single situation, but the fact that she 
turned a situation that most patients find somewhat anxiety-provoking- but basi- 
cally benign-into a battle to protect herself from abuse clearly suggests some- 
thing regarding the nature of her assumptions about the social world. The rela- 
tively brief relationship between this woman and myself thus proved to be a useful 
tool for the assessment of her object relations or “interpersonal schemata.” 
Repeated encounters such as this led Freud to focus, as early as 1895, on the 
relationship between therapist and patient, and to the notion of transference. 
Freud noticed that the attitude of the patient toward the therapist continually kept 
interfering with the business at hand of uncovering memories and associations. 
Eventually, he came to conclude that this peculiarity of the analytic situation is 
not in fact a hindrance but instead represents a fundamental part of the therapeu- 
tic process. 
The aim of this paper is to reanalyze the concept of transference from an 
information processing perspective and to show, from that perspective, how utili- 
zation of the interpersonal process between patient and therapist can be therapeu- 
tically useful. The purpose of applying information processing theory and re- 
search to the concept of transference is twofold. First, it provides an empirical 
grounding to a basic psychoanalytic concept, and demonstrates, using experi- 
mental research that is likely to be more convincing to empirically oriented 
clinicians and researchers, that transference phenomena not only occur but are 
therapeutically useful. In so doing, it puts transference notions into a language 
compatible with the understanding of a vast number of therapists (and cognitive 
psychologists) who do not otherwise find the psychoanalytic notion of transfer- 
ence compelling, and thus allows a greater number of practitioners to make use of 
a crucial therapeutic tool. Secondly, it offers a way of explaining transference that 
many psychodynamic clinicians may find useful, which retains the psychoanalytic 
understanding of unconscious motivational processes and intrapsychic transfor- 
mations without invoking a problematic tension-release, drive-discharge model 
of motivation that leaves many forms of adaptive behavior unexplained. In so 
doing, it tries to show how one can develop a more fine-grained understanding of 
transference by analyzing the specific information-processing mechanisms 
involved. 
The article will begin by summarizing very briefly the psychoanalytic theory of 
transference. It will then apply recent research on information processing and 
social cognition to the concept of transference and delineate six components of the 
transference process. Finally, it will attempt to integrate cognitive and psychody- 
namic concepts to demonstrate the importance of transference in psychotherapy 
as a mechanism for the assessment and alteration of dysfunctional scripts, expec- 
tancies, and wishes; the uncovering of state-dependent memories and schema- 
triggered affects; and the reworking of maladaptive modes of affect-regulation. It 
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will argue that to work therapeutically without utilizing transference phenomena 
is to discard a useful source of data and an important tool for therapeutic change. 
TRANSFERENCE IN PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGY 
While Freud first introduced the concept of transference in his Studies on Hysteria 
(1895) and discussed it again in the Dora case (1905), his first systematic treat- 
ment of the subject appeared in a 1912 essay in which he argues that people carry 
with them certain “stereotype plates” that determine their later erotic interests. He 
asserts that part of those templates is conscious and not immune to change, 
whereas another part, which forms the basis for transference, remains inaccessi- 
ble to consciousness and impervious to development. In that essay he introduces 
the notion of transference as a resistance, arguing that patients use transference 
feelings to distract them from conflictual issues. He ascribes in that essay an 
enormous role to transference in psychotherapy, arguing that the resolution of 
transference is synonymous with the resolution of neurosis (p. 101). 
In a later paper (19 15) he grapples with the relationship between transference- 
love and normal love and argues that transference-love is never related to aspects 
of the present situation and instead is “entirely composed of repetitions and copies 
of earlier reactions . . . ” (p. 167). In th a essay he reiterates the therapeutic t 
importance of working with transference, asserting that “the only really serious 
difficulties” the analyst must face “lie in the management of the transference” (p. 
159). 
In his Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Freud (1917) provides the first com- 
prehensive definition of transference: 
We mean a transference of feelings on to the person of the doctor since we do not 
believe that the situation in the treatment could justify the development of such 
feelings. We suspect, on the contrary, that the whole readiness for these feelings is 
derived from elsewhere, that they were already prepared in the patient and, upon 
the opportunity offered by the analytic treatment, are transferred on to the person of 
the doctor. (p. 442) 
The patient’s relationship to the therapist, he contends, stirs “new editions of the 
old conflicts: and the function of examining the transference is to help the patient 
re-evaluate these conflicts as an adult and revise previous repressions (p. 454). He 
returns to the same theme 20 years later in his last important discussion of 
transference (1937), arguing that analysis of transference is central to the mecha- 
nism of therapeutic change, which entails the “replacement (owing to the 
strengthening of the ego) of the inadequate decision made in infancy by a correct 
solution” (p. 321). He is arguing, in essence, that what seems frightening to a 
child and sets in motion various more or less automatic defenses to reduce the fear 
may not be frightening to an adult. Thus, by examining the conflict and the 
defense consciously as an adult, the person may find that the fear which elicited 
the defense is unrealistic, and that he therefore need not distort himself to protect 
against it. 
Currently, psychodynamic clinicians tend to use the term “transference” in one 
of two ways. They either use it narrowly to refer strictly to the transferring of 
thoughts, feelings, and fantasies about some childhood figure onto the therapist; 
or broadly, to refer to any aspect of the interpersonal process between patient and 
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therapist. This latter is the sense in which the term “counter-transference” is often 
used to refer to any emotional reaction the patient evokes in the therapist. (For 
more recent thought on transference, see Gill, 1982.) 
INFORMATION PROCESSING AND THE COMPONENTS OF TRANSFERENCE 
The psychoanalytic theory of transference leaves several important questions 
unresolved. The first pertains to the generality of a patient’s reaction to the 
therapist. The notion of transference as it has been used often does not distinguish 
between relatively circumscribed responses cued by specific features of the thera- 
pist or therapeutic situation, as opposed to more global responses that may be 
triggered in many or most interpersonal interactions or are uniquely reactivated 
in the therapy situation. As Wachtel(l981) h as p ointed out, clinicians tend not to 
look at the particular stimuli that elicit transference phenomena at a given point 
in a given therapy. 
A second issue relates to the distinction between transference and any other 
bond of affection. Freud (1915) argued that transference involves the reactivation 
of archaic imagoes and is thus, unlike real love, unrelated to the present reality. 
The problem with this is that, as Freud pointed out, every object finding is in 
some sense a refinding; to distinguish between reality elements and infantile 
elements is thus difficult in both theory and practice because any adult attach- 
ment is the end-product of a history of prior attachments. 
Finally, the suggestion that therapeutic work is completed with the resolution of 
the transference is problematic, as Freud (1937) himself came to acknowledge. 
Freud’s contention that all neurotic conflict becomes transferred onto the person 
of the analyst rests less upon clinical practice and observation than upon a theory 
of psychic energy that many in the psychoanalytic community now reject (e.g., 
Holt, 1976). Freud argued that the libido attached to the neurotic symptoms 
detaches itself from the symptoms and reattaches itself to the analyst in the course 
of the treatment. Without this assumption, one has little reason to believe that all 
of the patient’s conflicts come to revolve around the analyst so that resolving the 
transference would mean resolving the neurosis. 
Many of these problems stem from the use of the term transference to refer to 
many different phenomena, including thoughts about the therapist, feelings 
about the therapist, expectations of the therapist, expectations of people in gener- 
al, thoughts and feelings about the therapist that are analogous to early thoughts 
and feelings, thoughts and feelings about the therapist that are homologous or 
identical to early such thoughts and feelings, behavior patterns toward the thera- 
pist, resistance, erotic interest, etc. These difficulties can be ameliorated by ap- 
plying ideas from cognitive psychology to the concept of transference’ and sepa- 
rating out several distinct phenomena that are related to one another but not 
isomorphic. 
Before doing so it is important to note the parameters within which informa- 
tion-processing concepts can be expected to be useful. The notion that people 
‘Since this article was written, Singer (1985) has published an excellent paper in which he 
relates concepts of schema, script, and expectancy to the psychoanalytic notion of trans- 
ference. 
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form representations of social and nonsocial objects and ideas is central to both 
cognitive psychology and psychoanalysis, as is the concept of associational net- 
works that link various representations. To the extent that information-processing 
psychologists have developed methods for the rigorous study of these phenomena, 
their research can certainly be expected to enrich clinical understanding.* Sim- 
ilarly, recent research on social cognition and on cognitive-affective interactions 
undertaken from an information-processing perspective should be of enormous 
interest to psychoanalytically oriented clinical psychologists. Studies of social- 
cognitive development (Shantz, 1983), for example, are clearly of relevance to 
object-relations theory (see Westen, 1985). 
The limitation of information-processing psychology for clinical and psychoan- 
alytic theory and practice stems from the limits imposed by a computer metaphor: 
computers do not feel or wish. Cognitive psychology has yet to grapple with 
questions of motivation, though the recent turn to the study of cognitive-affective 
interactions holds the promise of future integrations of our knowledge of cogni- 
tion and psychodynamics. This article represents an effort in that direction. 
Transference as Person Schema/Object Representation 
The concept of “schema” has a long history, dating back to Piaget (1926) and 
Bartlett (1932), and it is currently being put to widespread use by social cognition 
researchers (e.g., Taylor & Cracker, 1981). Within academic psychology, Cantor 
and Mischel (1979) have argued that people tend to form prototypes for categori- 
zation of classes of people, and that the more the characteristics of a given person 
fit prototypical features, the more likely the stimulus person is to be treated as a 
member of that class. Within psychoanalysis, object-relations theorists have 
similarly focused for decades on mental representations of social objects. 
Piaget emphasized that forming an understanding in a given domain is an 
active process, and this is true in social cognition as in any other area of schema- 
building. A patient is always going to form a schema/object-representation of 
what the therapist is like, and this schema is likely to be distorted for both 
cognitive and motivational reasons, just as any social schema (or self-schema) is 
distorted. In terms of cognitive biases, Nisbett and Ross (1980) have catalogued a 
host of such sources of error in person perception, and it is the fate of creatures 
who must construct their understanding of reality that their constructions will 
always be imperfect. From the motivational side, patients have any number of 
reasons to distort their perceptions of their therapists, some of which will be 
detailed below. For example, they may idealize the therapist in order to identify 
with him or her, or they may vilify her in order to avoid hearing something 
painful she or he has to say. Though one may be tempted to restrict the use of the 
word transference to schemas distorted by motivational factors, as Wachtel(l981) 
argues, separating reality from distortion in defining transference is no easy task, 
since in any relationship neither party has a monopoly on objectivity, and ambi- 
guity calling for inference is the rule, not the exception. 
Various social schemas become transferentially relevant when they are evoked 
‘Landau and Goldfried (1981) have recently discussed the assessment of schemas in 
psychotherapy from a cognitive-behavioral standpoint. 
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because of similarity to the therapist or some situational cue. To the extent that 
the manner or appearance of the therapist resembles another person or exemplar 
of a category, schemas relevant to that person or category are likely to be activat- 
ed. Freud (1912) had just such a scenario in mind when discussing how a father- 
image could be activated in the course of therapy. Over an extended period of 
time the therapist is likely to see the activation of many such schemas and to 
become aware of patterns in their elicitation. Once the schema is activated, the 
person is likely to ignore details of the therapist’s behavior that do not fit the 
schema, as numerous studies have demonstrated the tenacity of schemas and the 
tendency to assimilate and selectively attend rather than to accommodate (see, 
e.g., Markus, 1977, on the tendency to recall confirming evidence). 
Not only may characteristics of the therapist evoke prior person schemas, but 
aspects of the therapeutic situation itself may do so. Cantor, Mischel, and Sch- 
wartz (1982) have proposed that people construct situation prototypes, and to the 
extent that features of the therapy situation meet prototypical features, the person 
is likely to assimilate the current situation to old schemas. Patients frequently 
discuss feeling judged by therapists who maintain a nonjudgmental stance; telling 
one’s inner thoughts and confessing wishes and deeds to someone in a position of 
authority and with whom one has an asymmetrical relationship evokes various 
parental and other authority prototypes. One patient, when discussing his feel- 
ings toward therapy or toward me, would frequently shift into talking about his 
relationships with his students. Putting aside for a moment whatever dynamic 
significance that may have had, at a strictly cognitive level he appears to have 
assimilated therapy to his “school schema.” He informed me during one session 
that he felt very uncomfortable in therapy because he wanted me to correct his 
character like one would criticize a paper, by marking “good” by certain parts and 
red-penciling others that could use some improvement. If only I would do that, he 
thought, he could quickly revise those characterological sentence splices. He 
commented that he finds the lack of explicit expectations on my part unnerving, 
adding that his students know precisely what they must do to receive a good 
grade. In this case an elaborate schema has been evoked, and one has reason to 
suspect that earlier aspects of the schema in which he was pupil rather than 
teacher were operative as well. 
Transference as Attachment 
A second aspect of transference is the patient’s attachment to the therapist. One 
could account for this attachment in a number of ways. First, as Bowlby (1969, 
1973) and others (e.g., Sroufe & Waters, 1979) h ave argued, human beings 
appear to have an innately based tendency to form attachments, and that a person 
would do so in a relationship which fits a number of person- and situation- 
prototypes of early attachments is not surprising. Freud meant by his comment 
that every object finding is really an object re-finding that we learn to love in the 
context of our early relationships with our caretakers, and that the understanding 
we form of love is forever conditioned by these experiences. From a cognitive 
perspective, one can readily see how one schema builds upon the next develop- 
mentally, and how early images of relationships may be integrated into later 
schemas. This is by no means to deny that significant accommodation occurs 
along the way; rather, it is to suggest that prototypes of love objects and modes of 
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attaching formed in infancy and childhood are likely to exert influence on subse- 
quent object choices because old schemas never die: they fade away through 
disuse, are incorporated in various ways into subsequent schemas, or are re- 
pressed and periodically activated without conscious awareness. 
As I have argued elsewhere (Westen, 1985), one need not accept the more 
mechanistic aspects of Freud’s drive theory to believe in the impact of early object 
relations on later social experience. One could argue, instead, that human infants 
have a genetically wired tendency toward social behavior and attachment, and 
that this differentiates into various social needs (including friendship, love, inti- 
macy, sexual intimacy, etc.), rather than that all such needs are manifestations of 
the sexual instinct. Any of these needs may be evoked in psychotherapy, so that 
one would expect to see, for example, erotic transferences as well as simple 
attachments to the therapist. As will be argued shortly, these various needs are 
likely to call upon similar information processing channels, so that in many cases 
they can be expected to arise in conjunction with one another. 
Attachment to the therapist may arise through a second way. As Zajonc (1968) 
has shown, familiarity tends to lead to liking, and to the extent that the therapist 
becomes a familiar figure, he is likely to evoke positive feeling. Thirdly, symptom 
reduction, if attributed to therapy, will lead to attachment as the therapist be- 
comes associated with relief, although the opposite side of this coin is that anxiety 
experienced in therapeutic work also becomes associated with the therapist (and 
frequently is responsible for premature terminations). Finally, telling intimate 
details of one’s life to another person is likely to evoke schemas previously asso- 
ciated with attachment, such as parental schemas and “close friend” schemas. 
Transference as Schema-Triggered Affecl 
Clinicians frequently speak of transference when a patient expresses positive or 
negative feelings toward the therapist. The patient may develop both continuous 
and momentary feelings toward the therapist just as he would toward anyone else. 
These feelings must obviously be understood in the context of the person’s prior 
experience, as resulting from interactions between that experience and the cur- 
rent situation. Affects may be triggered directly by schemas activated through 
their perceived similarity to aspects of the therapist or therapy situation. Fiske 
(1982) has developed the notion of schema-triggered affect, by which she means 
that when features of a stimulus match characteristics of a cognitive prototype, 
the affect associated with the previous schema will be activated. In other words, 
classes of stimuli- and she studied social stimuli in particular- have affects at- 
tached, so that presentation of a member of that class will evoke the category- 
based affect. This is, of course, a phenomenon stereotype researchers (and vic- 
tims of stereotypes) have known for decades. A member of a minority group may 
find that those around him begin with negative feelings toward him simply be- 
cause they have attached an affect to a category, and he is an instance of that 
category. 
Fiske performed a series of experiments which demonstrated that the greater 
the number of prototypic features that characterize the stimulus person, the more 
likely is schema-based affect to be triggered, and degree of affect varies by degree 
of association (i.e., number of shared attributes). According to Fiske, “When new 
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information can be fit into old affectively laden knowledge, then the person has 
available an immediate affective response” (p. 57). 
In psychotherapy an affect may be triggered in precisely this way. The patient 
may not always be aware of the category that is being triggered; she may simply 
experience the affect and have no awareness of the schema to which she has 
assimilated something in the therapy situation. Assumptions about unconscious 
processes of this sort, essential to clinical understanding, have recently received 
considerable experimental support. Shevrin and Dickman (1980) and Nisbett and 
Wilson (1977) h ave impressively demonstrated the extent of cognitive processing 
of which a person is not aware, and the likelihood is high that recognition of 
categorical processing may be an experience to which the individual is not intro- 
spectively privy and can only reconstruct post facto. If such is the case, an 
important aspect of therapeutic work may be to explore associations to the affect 
that may give a clue to its category-triggered origins, in order to examine whether 
the affect attached to the category is really an appropriate one or one that may 
need to be reworked. Interestingly, Freud argued that the cathexis of the analyst 
“will have recourse to prototypes, will attach itself to one of the stereotype plates 
which are present in the subject; or, to put the position in another way, the 
cathexis will introduce the doctor into one of the psychical ‘series’ which the 
patient has already formed” (1912, p. 100, emphasis added). Emotions in psycho- 
therapy that can be called transference-related may also arise through the cueing 
of episodic memories (Tulving, 1972) with affects attached. For example, a pa- 
tient who began coming late to sessions appraised my relatively neutral sugges- 
tion that we try to understand the meaning of the lateness during one session as a 
sadistic expression of rage at her. She associated shortly afterward to a painful 
memory in which her father beat her for coming home late. In this example a 
strongly charged memory intervened in her appraisal of my response and pro- 
duced an inappropriate affective reaction of fear. In this case, however, I had 
reason to believe that her lateness was a dynamically meaningful repetition of her 
early experience, so that the memory may have been operative prior to her 
lateness and involved in producing it. 
Transference as Interpersonal Expectancies 
People carry with them expectations about what the world holds in store, and 
these expectations apply not only to the natural world but to the social world as 
well. Rotter (1966) has emphasized the extent to which we form such expectancies 
about ourselves, such as internal or external locus of control. Hume argued that 
as scientists we must make the rationally unfounded assumption that nature will 
continue to operate much the same tomorrow as it did today, and as intuitive 
scientists (Ross, 1977) we must make a similar assumption if we wish to maintain 
some sort of order in our lives. Without such an assumption, a scientist could 
never generalize or predict, and a person could never plan or anticipate. At the 
interpersonal level, Erikson’s (1963) notion of basic trust denotes a similar as- 
sumption of the continuity and sameness over time of ourselves and significant 
others. Without such an assumption, the world of people appears malevolent and 
capricious, and life is perpetual chaos. 
The vignette with which this paper opened portrays rather starkly the pheno- 
menological reality of a woman who lives in such a world, a reality common to 
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many with borderline personality disorders. One can readily see how her encoun- 
ter with me revealed certain generalized expectancies about what people will do to 
her. One crucial distinction that is too seldom made in psychoanalytic discussions 
of transference is between relatively specific, and generalized expectancies. Cog- 
nitive psychology has for years relied upon hierarchical models of the storage of 
information within categories and sub-categories. One should therefore not be 
surprised to find interpersonal expectancies ordered in such a fashion, and one 
could hypothesize that to the extent that such expectancies are more generalized, 
they will be more recalcitrant to therapeutic change. Unfortunately, such expec- 
tancies can also be expected to have the most pervasive impact on interpersonal 
functioning. 
Generalized expectancies of the behavioral responses of social actors form a 
large category, of which expectancies about men, women, authority figures, and 
the like form sub-classes with more specific expectancies. At the least general level 
are expectancies related to the behaviors of particular persons in particular situa- 
tions. Whenever the patient displays an expectation about the therapist, the latter 
must-within the limitations of admittedly imperfect clinical inference processes 
(see Turk & Salovey, in press) - attempt to discover the highest-level category to 
which the expectation applies. The clinician should ideally do this through an 
hypothesis-testing process that entails looking for patterns and comparing specific 
reactions to the therapist with known reactions of the patient to other people and 
classes of people (see Strupp & Binder, 1984). While in theory the distinction 
between levels of expectancy has not been made in psychoanalytic writing on 
transference, in practice clinicians comment far less upon reactions to the thera- 
pist that appear idiosyncratic and situation-specific, as compared to those that 
emerge repeatedly in the patient’s life. 
Transference as Scripts 
Another aspect of transference is the activation of scripts. Abelson (1981) and 
Schank and Abelson (1977) have elaborated the concept of scripts, by which they 
mean schemas embodying knowledge of stereotyped event sequences. Scripts 
permit comprehension of social events and organize action. They often include 
expectations of specific sequences of action, and studies such as Bower, Black, and 
Turner (1979) and Graesser, Woll, Kowalski, and Smith (1980) provide evidence 
that people tend to fill in gaps of knowledge about specific social interactions with 
stereotyped scripted knowledge. 
Scripts are routinized and do not necessarily require conscious attention. One 
completes the steps required to dine at a restaurant, for example, without con- 
sciously planning each step (such as reading the menu). The routinized nature of 
scripts renders them likely to be evoked without conscious attention, and one 
suspects that, as in the case of other schemas, they will be activated to the extent 
that consciously or unconsciously cognized events or cues match certain features 
encoded in the script. This renders likely the elicitation of scripts in psychother- 
apy that have become routinized in relation to other situations. Numerous scripts 
may, for example, be activated when in the presence of an authority, and such 
scripts are likely to bear imprints of early authority relationships. 
With scripts as with other schemas, the clinician must attempt to assess the 
generality or specificity of eliciting conditions. At the broadest level, an individual 
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may have a script for general social interaction and a series of hierarchically 
arranged subscripts ranging from interaction with women to interaction with 
mother when confessing a misdeed. Patients frequently recognize the activation 
of such scripts in therapy, as when a patient spontaneously offered that hc was 
telling me all of his failures and avoiding discussing any triumphs just as he did 
with his mother, who would commiserate with the cruelty of the world but turn 
icy at any indication of pride. The activation of such scripts is obviously not 
independent of the evocation of related schemas such as generalized or specific 
interpersonal expectancies. This particular patient not only behaved toward me 
as he had toward his mother but expected me to respond as she did, and he was at 
first angry and surprised when I did not. The script notion can encompass such 
schemas since it includes knowledge of reciprocal role relations. 
Transference as Wishes 
In the above example, one should note that the patient may not only have been 
activating an interactional script but may also have been wishing for a particular 
type of interaction that he expected to find gratifying. The script notion cannot 
speak to motivational factors such as the patient’s desire for me to be like his 
mother. One of the central aspects of transference described by psychoanalysts 
and psychodynamic psychotherapists is the activation of archaic wishes that are 
transferred onto the therapist. The question arises as to whether such phenomena 
can be usefully examined in relation to information-processing theory and 
research. 
As yet, motivational constructs have not proven easily integrable into informa- 
tion processing theory. In a recent book (Westen, 1985) I have suggested that 
certain cognitive-affective structures may be useful in accounting for motivation 
and in integrating psychodynamic and cognitive-behavioral theories. One form of 
these is the wish. A wish includes a cognition of a desired state and an anticipated 
affect associated with attainment of that state. It also includes a cognition of the 
current status of one’s attainment or non-attainment of that state, and an affect 
arising from the discrepancy between desired and cognized reality. A person can 
be motivated to act either by the anticipated positive affect associated with attain- 
ment of the wish, or by the negative affect arising from the discrepancy between 
ideal and cognized reality. For example, a patient who has developed an erotic 
transference has a wish to have sexual contact with her or his therapist. This 
means that she has formed an affect-laden schema of an end-state or goal and is 
motivated to reduce the discrepancy between the goal and cognized reality by an 
aversive affect (e.g., a sense of longing) or by an imagined positive affect (e.g., 
joy or sexual gratification) if she could achieve her desire. She may achieve this 
goal in displacement by acting out behaviorally, or she may perform a mental 
operation, such as fantasizing, to allay her distress or achieve satisfaction. In both 
cases her action (either behavioral or mental) is motivated by an affect produced 
by this schema. Every element of this cognitive-affective schema and the re- 
sponses it evokes (including the affect-laden set-goal, the understanding of reality 
and expectations of resultant affect if the wish is fulfilled, the discrepancy, and the 
choice of response to the affect) has a history which is involved in producing the 
transference experience. 
This view of wishes is not incompatible with psychoanalytic drive theory, as 
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recently reformulated by Brenner (1982). Brenner has argued that the concept of 
“drive” is actually an abstraction or generalization from the empirical observation 
of wishes. According to Brenner, wishes are the motivating force in mental life, 
and are primary data in analytic hours. Drives, in contrast, are theoretical con- 
structs derived from these data. A central aspect of Freud’s theory of transference 
is that transference involves the reactivation of old drives or drive derivatives 
transferred onto the analyst. From the perspective of Brenner’s reformulation, 
this means that transference entails the displacement of archaic wishes onto the 
therapist. 
Psychoanalytic theory is weak in its explanation of why particular wishes will 
become salient at particular times, or why certain people will become the object of 
a wish. Freudian psychosexual theory focuses on a biological timetable of unfold- 
ing instinctual aims and objects, but this strictly biological developmental view 
cannot explain why particular wishes of various sorts become associated with 
specific objects in adulthood. Empirical research is also lacking on conditions for 
the evocation of wishes, but one has reason to suppose that one way they may be 
activated is through typical information processing channels, similar to the acti- 
vation of other schemas (see, e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975; Anderson, 1983). A 
wish may be viewed as a “node” on a semantic network which can be activated 
when other associations along the network have been “primed.” Wishes that are 
associatively connected to particular thoughts, feelings, or memories can thus be 
reawakened if these associated mental events are activated. Further, one may 
suppose that a wish, like any other schema, is more likely to be elicited to the 
extent that situational (or intrapsychic) circumstances fit certain prototypical 
characteristics. In psychotherapy, wishes from previous situations and relation- 
ships may thus be evoked, so that the patient desires things from the therapist that 
she or he desired from significant others. Since the therapy relationship may be 
one of a small number of relationships with elements that resemble early relation- 
ships, the possibility arises that the patient may experience archaic wishes with 
the therapist that may have been dormant for years. 
As with other schemas, one must distinguish between category levels with 
respect to wishes. Wishes may be quite general (e.g., broad interpersonal wishes 
such as the desire to be liked) or specific (e.g., the wish for one’s father to stay 
home on one’s birthday as a child rather than to travel out of town, to prove his 
affection). Again, the clinician must attempt to discover the level of generality of 
wishes experienced toward the therapist and any pattern of their elicitation within 
and without the therapy situation. 
Transference as Defense 
Psychoanalytic psychologists argue that not only does transference entail the 
reenactment of archaic wishes, but that many of these wishes are repressed. One 
of the greatest stumbling blocks to integration of psychodynamic with informa- 
tion processing models is that cognitivists and psychodynamic psychologists dis- 
agree upon whether one needs to explain certain phenomena with motivational 
constructs (such as drives and defenses) or whether one can more parsimoniously 
explain the same phenomena in cognitive terms. Nisbett and Ross (1980), for 
example, detail a bevy of factors that bias that “intuitive scientist’s” understanding 
of self and others, and they argue for strictly cognitive explanations. Elsewhere 
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(Westen, 1985) I have argued that one need not pose the question as information 
processing versus defense if one synthesizes an understanding of the elicitation and 
management of affect with information processing mechanisms. In so doing one 
can bring together certain aspects of psychodynamic and cognitive-behavioral 
theory. One can do this by examining what I have called a cognitive-evaluative 
mismatch, of which a wish (as described earlier) is a subtype. The basic notion is 
derived from systems theory and suggests that an individual establishes a “set- 
goal” or ideal state with respect to some stimulus or situation, and that a discrep- 
ancy or “mismatch” between set-goal and cognized reality produces an affect or 
feeling. The affect performs a feedback function, activating various control mech- 
anisms designed to minimize the affect. 
These control mechanisms may be either behavioral or mental. The function of 
both is to alleviate the dysphoric affect, and to the extent that a control mecha- 
nism is successful, it will be “negatively reinforced” through its association with 
reduction of a painful emotional state. The behavior or defense mechanism will 
be encoded as a successful solution and will thus be more likely to be activated 
upon presentation of a similar situation. If, for example, a child develops death 
wishes toward a parent and compares these wishes with internalized moral stan- 
dards, the discrepancy between these standards and cognized reality produces a 
painful affect, guilt. In order to alleviate the guilt, he may utilize a behavior 
(acting especially nice to the parent) or a defense (denying his aggressive wishes) 
or some combination of behavior and defense. In each case he is reducing the 
cognitive-evaluative mismatch between ideal and cognized reality, either by mak- 
ing reparation or by distorting his self-understanding. The result is a diminution 
of the guilt and an association of the control mechanism with guilt reduction. 
Repeated success with a particular mechanism may result in its automatic 
elicitation in similar circumstances. Again, in evaluating the use of such mecha- 
nisms a therapist must try to pin down the specificity or generality of their use and 
of the stimuli that elicit them. The notion of cognitive-evaluative mismatch is in 
many ways similar to Lazarus’s (1981) discussion of the processes through which 
stress activates various coping mechanisms, and Plutchik’s (1980) analysis, fol- 
lowing Freud, of the utilization of defenses to modulate anxiety.’ 
Freud argued as early as 1912 that transference can be used as a defense or, as 
defenses are frequently considered in psychoanalysis and psychodynamic psycho- 
therapy, a resistance. (For a comparative analysis of resistance in cognitive- 
behavioral and psychoanalytic treatment, see Wachtel, 1982 .) This defensive 
function of transference must be distinguished from other aspects of the relation- 
ship between patient and therapist that are often labeled as transference (such as 
attachment or erotic interest) because it may operate independently of these other 
aspects. One defensive use of the transference occurs when a patient focuses upon 
current features of the relationship with the therapist in order to avoid bringing to 
awareness painful prototypes of the present situation. Characteristics of the rela- 
tionship with the therapist may become salient because of their association with 
affect-laden material, while the thoughts or wishes originally associated with the 
“See also Haan’s (1977) work on coping and defending. I have here provided only an 
extremely simplified example; elsewhere (Westen, 1985) I have developed the model in 
considerable detail. 
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affect remain repressed. Similarly, the patient may defensively focus on the thera- 
pist or the therapeutic relationship to aid in repression of, or selective inattention 
to material not related to the therapist. Another defensive use of the transference 
occurs when the patient distorts his image of the therapist into someone inept or 
untrustworthy; in so doing he can prevent himself from processing comments or 
interpretations that are potentially painful or anxiety-provoking. 
THERAPEUTIC USES OF TRANSFERENCE 
One may thus distinguish seven phenomena that frequently fall under the rubric 
of transference: person schemas/object representations, attachments, schema- 
triggered affects, interpersonal expectancies, scripts, wishes, and defenses. If one 
wishes to speak coherently about transference, it is important to distinguish 
between these aspects, since the degree to which they, or their eliciting events 
covary is by no means clear. 
I will now try to demonstrate the usefulness of working with transference as a 
therapeutic tool, using convergent data from the laboratory to corroborate the 
psychodynamic assertion, based on clinical experience, that the use of transfer- 
ence material is therapeutically critical. 
The Assessment and Alteration of Scripts, Expectancies, and Wishes 
One important use of transference is in the assessment and alteration of scripts, 
expectancies, and wishes. Transference phenomena allow the therapist to peer 
beyond the patient’s self-reports by demonstrating in vivid detail the way the 
patient interacts with, and what the patient expects and desires from, significant 
others (see Strupp & Binder, 1984). Th’ is is not to imply that clinicians are always 
successful in assessing the generality of those schemas. Clinical inference is difli- 
cult enough when dealing with behaviors, let alone with schemas (especially 
schemas uncovered through interaction). In this respect, the analysis of transfer- 
ence is a microcosm of social scientific method: it is at once hermeneutic and 
positivist. On the one hand, interpretation of transference material is a herme- 
neutic art, akin to the interpretation of a text because the words and deeds of the 
patient are likely to function as metaphor. This can be explained by examining 
the interaction of cognitive and dynamic processes. Since certain thoughts and 
wishes are connected with painful affects, they are likely to be repressed and thus 
to remain inaccessible to consciousness. Yet cognitions associated with them may 
emerge into consciousness (because the repression does not obliterate the entire 
associational network), or be incorporated into easily assimilable aspects of the 
therapy situation, such as thoughts about the therapist or events being described 
in the treatment hour. The result is that the patient communicates in metaphor, 
and the interpretation of symbols is as difficult in therapeutic discourse as it is in 
literature. On the other hand, once the therapist begins to suspect the presence of 
a latent web of associations, he must act like a natural scientist as hypothesis 
tester, presenting and listening for situations likely to confirm or disconfirm the 
hypothesis. He may speak to the patient in related metaphor or directly interpret 
the material and gauge the patient’s reactions. In his hypothesis-testing he is 
vulnerable to the same distortions as other “intuitive scientists” (Ross, 1977), 
whose schemas tend to be more robust in assimilating or ignoring discrepant 
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information than they should, but this is a limitation of all science, not just 
intuitive science or clinical practice.’ 
The relationship between therapist and patient is an invaluable source of infor- 
mation about the patient’s interpersonal action schemas (scripts), assumptions 
about the social world (expectancies), and wishes. As noted earlier, a great deal of 
research has demonstrated that much of cognitive processing occurs outside of 
awareness, and decades of clinical work attests to the unconscious “processing” of 
motives and affects. Indeed, a wealth of experimental evidence has recently been 
adduced to document unconscious emotional processes as well (Westen, 1985). 
Many of these scripts, expectancies, and wishes become routinized and are acti- 
vated automatically in relevant circumstances. Consequently, if recognized at all, 
they appear “natural” to the patient, who has been using them for years. The 
therapist may use such phenomena in the transference not only to learn about the 
patient’s schemas but also to point them out to the patient and thus de-routinize 
them. By making these schemas explicit and conscious, the therapist can help the 
patient examine and change them if they appear to be erroneous or maladaptive. 
The Uncovering of State-Dependent Memories and Schema-Triggered Affects 
Much recent experimental research (Bower, 1981; Derry & Kuiper, 1981; Roth & 
Rehm, 1980; Clark & Teasdale, 1982) h as demonstrated the significance of feel- 
ing states on memory retrieval. This research has shown that retrieval of affect- 
laden thoughts or memories is influenced by mood at the time of retrieval. Bower 
(1981) has applied this to both semantic and episodic memory (Tulving, 1972) 
and has demonstrated the effect of mood on recall of childhood memories. To the 
extent that the therapeutic situation evokes old schemas, it is likely to activate 
associated affects, which in turn trigger state-dependent memories. Freud (1917, 
p. 454) similarly argued that a central function of transference is that it awakens 
old conflicts. From a perspective that integrates cognitive and dynamic concepts, 
a conflict can be understood as the presence of wishes, cognitive-evaluative mis- 
matches, or other cognitive-affective schemas, such that satisfaction of one such 
motive has a negative influence on another. Satisfaction of an aggressive wish, for 
example, may simultaneously conflict with an “ideal self’ set-goal (or “superego 
prohibition”), producing a cognitive-evaluative mismatch and consequently a 
feeling of guilt. As psychoanalytic theory and practice suggests, the response to a 
conflict of this sort is likely to be a compromise formation. 
The utility of triggering such memories, affects, and conflicts is that they may 
lie at the root of dysfunctional behavior and mental processes. One of the funda- 
mental assumptions of psychoanalytic method (see Rapaport, 1944) is that every 
thought, wish, and fantasy has a history. In Piagetian terms, every schema is the 
end-product of a series of assimilations and accommodations. A crucial aspect of 
the schemas determinative of much of human behavior-and of psychopatholo- 
gy - is that they are affective as well as cognitive. 
*Kuhn (1970), in fact, rejected Popper’s (1963) view of science as a hypothetico-deductive, 
hypothesis-testing enterprise precisely because he found, in scrutinizing the history of 
science, that disconfirming instances only topple a paradigm when they are overwhelming 
and when an alternative paradigm is in existence. 
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Developmentally, as the cognitive component of a schema changes, associated 
affects may also change, but in other cases they may not. Similarly, while a new 
schema may become more prominent in a network of associations and therefore 
more retrievable, old versions of the schema may continue to influence behavior 
despite their relative inaccessibility to consciousness. In both cases more primitive 
affects associated with a cognition may inhibit satisfaction or maintain a dysfunc- 
tional behavior. For example, as Freud’s psychosexual theory has long made clear, 
affects attached to sex that are either culturally prescribed or based upon onto- 
genetically primitive conceptions of sexuality may impede sexual pleasure or 
behavior. Wishes developed in childhood toward significant others may similarly 
continue to be operative and may be revealed in the transference. A crucial 
feature of primitive wishes, conflicts, affective responses, and memories of this 
sort is that they may become repressed in childhood to avoid dysphoric affect. As 
a result, they may remain encapsulated in “pockets” of unworked-through cogni- 
tive-affective networks and may continue to direct thought and behavior. By 
bringing these cognitive-affective structures to consciousness, the patient can 
begin to reassess as an adult whether these structures are realistic and whether the 
way they were regulated in childhood should continue to operate.’ 
Freud (1937, p. 321) referred to this aspect of the therapeutic process as the 
replacement of an infantile decision by a more adaptive one. At times, the trans- 
ference provides the only access to such material, by eliciting affects that recruit 
relevant memories and wishes. For example, a borderline patient whom I had 
been seeing for over a year started to withdraw without clear cause, refusing to 
talk and sitting glumly in her chair. We had previously discussed a similar pattern 
in her life of suddenly severing relations with people important to her, but the 
pattern was now emerging- with corresponding affect - in the transference. She 
was aware of her actions but angrily told me that she would not and could not 
explain them. I suggested to her that someone does not pull away from another 
person like that unless she is afraid of something, at which point she volunteered 
that she did not know what she feared, but that she was sure something terribly 
bad would happen if she did not run. The combination of her experiencing this 
feeling with me and eliciting thoughts and memories congruent with the affect 
allowed us to explore the fear behind her behavior, and repeated experiences of 
this sort allowed her both to reanalyze (cognitively) conditions under which fear 
has been inappropriately evoked, and to see that, in fact, her fears are not 
confirmed in interaction with me. This latter aspect of use of the transference is 
similar to in uiuo exposure techniques in behavioral treatment. Wachtel(l977) has 
lucidly argued for the importance of exposure to anxiety-provoking thoughts, 
images, and stimuli in both psychoanalytic and behavioral therapies, proposing 
jAnalysis of schema-related affects is central to both psychodynamic and cognitive-behav- 
ioral understanding of behavior and psychopathology. For example, with respect to pho- 
bias, while the two approaches differ significantly in etiological theories, both presuppose 
(translating into information processing terms) that an affect has erroneously become 
attached to a cognitive representation, so that the person is afraid of an innocuous 
stimulus. Similarly, the person may have developed presently maladaptive self-efficacy 
and outcome expectancies (Bandura, 1977, 1982) at a time in which they may or may not 
have been appropriate, and bringing these to light can help the person alter his behavior. 
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that the gradual movement from screen memories and thoughts to more deeply 
repressed material is, in part, similar to systematic desensitization. 
The Reworking of Behavioral and Intrapsychic Affect-Regulation Mechanisms 
In the above example, one avenue for making inroads on the patient’s very 
problematic object relations was to address her pattern of withdrawing from 
intimate relationships as a way of reducing her fear. She was afraid both of her 
own rage and destructiveness and of the motives of anyone who would become 
close to her, and these fears had roots in her earliest experiences of intimacy and 
closeness. In order to be of help to someone in a situation such as this, the 
therapist must first point out the behavior, then link it with the affect, explore the 
source of the affect (which in this case no longer conforms to reality), and finally 
either reduce the affect or help the patient develop a more adaptive response. 
Many of the responses that appear pathological in adults were originally re- 
sponses to rational or irrational fears earlier in life; the response became 
routinized in childhood when it was associated with regulation of the aversive 
affect. One significant aim of treatment is thus, as Freud put it, to make the 
unconscious conscious: a person cannot alter a behavior of which he is not aware, 
and he is unlikely even then to change it unless he understands that the function it 
serves is unnecessary or that a more efficient mechanism may be used in its place. 
If this is true of behaviors or scripts that are automatically evoked, it is equally 
true of intrapsychic processes (defenses and other compromise formations) which 
fulfill the similar function of regulation of affect. Defenses are more difficult to 
expose than many behaviors because their efficacy presupposes their inaccessibili. 
ty to consciousness; repression does not work (i.e., does not alleviate an aversive 
emotional state) if one is aware that one is repressing. The patient has good 
reason to avoid awareness of such defenses because their use has been “reinforced” 
by the elimination of a painful affect. The patient is thus unlikely to be willing to 
relinquish a defense unless he has come to see that the situation is not so unpleas- 
ant or frightening, or that he can respond to it in ways that will not so greatly 
compromise other motives or produce as much distress. 
Examination of transference is especially useful because it allows the therapir 
directly to observe the behavioral and defensive processes the patient brings to 
bear, especially in social situations. It also gives the therapist concrete and mutu- 
ally verifiable evidence of these processes to help the patient recognize them, even 
when doing so is threatening or painful. In addition, bringing to light conflictual 
material allows for the emergence of more deeply buried issues that are them- 
selves likely to emerge in the transference, in part sometimes creating what 
psychoanalysts refer to as the “transference neurosis” (see, e.g., Blum, 1971; 
Weinshel, 1971). Further, Freud emphasized the patient’s use of transference as 
resistance, a resistance which, if not interpreted, can frequently lead to termina- 
tion of treatment. This resistance may emerge whether or not the therapist be- 
lieves in the concept of transference (see Wachtel, 1982). 
CONCLUSIONS 
A general discussion of the causal agents in therapeutic change is obviously 
outside the parameters of the article, though the foregoing suggests two crucial 
avenues for change: the alteration of dysfunctional schemas, and the reworking of 
Transference and Information Processing 177 
behavioral and defensive responses evoked to regulate affect.h Both are central to 
psychodynamic psychotherapy, though the alteration of childhood constructions 
of reality has received less attention at a theoretical level than motivational and 
defensive shifts. The theoretical systems underlying cognitive therapies have paid 
great attention to the (conscious) cognitive processes involved in psychopathology 
but have not as yet come to integrate an understanding of the dynamic influence 
of affect and affect-regulation mechanisms on mental and behavioral events. To 
the extent that the phenomena delineated here as aspects of transference can be 
useful in the assessment and alteration of schemas and modes of affect-regulation, 
they provide an important tool for therapeutic change. That the use of a process 
which enlists the active participation of the patient may be especially efficacious in 
treatment should not be surprising to cognitive-behavioral clinicians. Behavioral 
therapists for some time have known that participatory modeling is more effica- 
cious that observational learning, and one would thus expect that activating real 
feelings, interactional patterns, and schemas in psychotherapy would have great- 
er impact than simply talking about them or observing them at a distance. 
One could conclude from all this that Freud was overstating the matter some- 
what when he claimed that the transference is the battlefield upon which all battles 
must be fought in psychotherapy (1917, p. 454). The schemas and affect-regula- 
tion mechanisms evoked in therapy are only a subset of the person’s repertoire, 
albeit a subset to which the therapist will have greater access and with which he is 
more likely to effect lasting change.’ Nevertheless, while Freud was not entirely 
correct in asserting, in the passage with which this paper began, that one can 
never destroy anyone in absentia, he was no doubt brilliantly insightful in his 
recognition that even a straw man burns faster than a memory. 
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